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In [Lakoff 1987], conceptual embodiment is described as the idea
that the properties of certain categories are a consequence of the nature
of human biological capacities and of the experience of functioning in a
physical and social environment. It is contrasted with the ``objectivist''
idea that concepts exist independently of the bodily nature of any thinking
beings and independently of their experience (p. 12). Several sources from
the cognitive science literature at large are cited in [Lakoff 1987] as
having contributed to the development of this idea. My definition of
embodiment in the context of autonomous agents is more restricted, but more
precise (Section ).
According to [Harnad 1990], symbolic representations must be grounded bottom-up in non-symbolic representations of two kinds:
Part of my model of color perception and color naming
(Chapter ) is a color space defined by several
dimensions derived from or modeled after the activations of the cone
photoreceptors in the human retina. This is an analog (continuous)
transform of the sensory ``projection'' of the radiation reflected off the
``distal'' surface of the object being imaged; therefore, it qualifies as
an iconic representation. A second part of the model is a mapping from each
point in the color space to one or more pairs consisting of a color term
and a ``confidence'' or ``goodness'' measure. The codomain of this mapping
qualifies as a categorical representation, in Harnad's framework. My model
does not involve symbolic representations of the kind Harnad envisions, as
it is limited to the level of terms only, not sentences.
Harnad lists five tasks a cognitive theory has to explain: discrimination, identification, manipulation, describing, and responding to descriptions of objects, events, and states of affairs in the world. A CLR (Color Labeling Robot) is in principle able to perform all these tasks:
lammens@cs.buffalo.edu